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Recaudador vs. contribuyente: el juego de la evasión fiscal

  • José Lara Pulido

    (El Colegio de México, A. C.)

Registered author(s):

    This paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players' best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that “greater sanctions, the establishment of fiscal discipline, the improvement of monitoring processes, and less corruption, reduce fiscal evasion". Finally, it is established that, if sufficiently deep, progressiveness on the tax system has a beneficial impact in collection, and that economic growth provokes both, a reduction in evasion and the improvement of social welfare.

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    File URL: http://codex.colmex.mx:8991/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/9R7BNA1I1J4VB7C7MYA19C19FGFSQE.pdf
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    Article provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its journal Estudios Económicos.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 313-334

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    Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:22:y:2007:i:2:p:313-334
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/

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    1. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    2. Friedrich Schneider & Robert Klinglmair, 2004. "Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-03, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Corchon, Luis C., 1992. "Tax evasion and the underground economy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 445-454, October.
    4. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
    5. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
    6. Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000. "Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration," NBER Working Papers 7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Greenberg, Joseph, 1984. "Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-13, February.
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