Recycling channel design and coordination in a reverse supply chain with customer green preference

This study investigates the selection of recycling mode and the coordination mechanism in a reverse supply chain (RSC) that consists of one remanufacturer, one traditional recycler, and one smart recycler. We characterize the collection cost differences between traditional recycling and smart recycling, and the scrap rate of used products by smart recycling. We consider three recycling modes with recycling pricing competition, conditional on whether the remanufacturer collaborates with the traditional recycler, with the smart recycler, or with both recyclers. We show that the optimal recycling channel strategy for the remanufacturer is to enroll both the traditional recycler and the smart recycler, and the competition between these two recyclers exerts some non-trial implications on the firms’ equilibrium pricing strategy and profitability. By comparing the equilibrium outcomes with a centralized system, we further develop two coordination contracts: a two-part tariff contract and a transfer price combined with a profit-sharing contract, both of which can effectively mitigate double marginalization and improve the supply chain’s overall performance. Our findings provide useful guidance for the design of recycling channels, and for the coordination of RSC members to achieve Pareto improvement.