Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness
This paper aims to show that aggregate tax evasion may be largely explained by tax morale and that tax morale is dependent on the taxpayers' intrinsic attitudes to honesty and social stigma. The theoretical hypothesis is that these attitudes are influenced by the taxpayers' perceptions of the size of tax evasion as well as by their perceptions of the policy maker's effectiveness in exercising control over the relevant macroeconomic variables and safeguarding the interests of citizens. Applying Gordon's [Gordon, J.P.F., 1989. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European Economic Review 33(4), 797-805] framework, a dynamic model of aggregate tax evasion is proposed whereby multiple equilibria may emerge. Econometric analysis on Latin American countries supports the assumptions made in the model.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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