A note on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Marketing Channel Coordination’
Goering (2012) works on a bilateral monopoly with perfect marketing channel coordination to analyze the effects of corporate social responsibility. He starts the analysis of a bilateral monopoly with socially concerned firms where either the manufacturer or the retailer is additionally to its profit interested in a share of consumer surplus. In this short note, we extend this analysis and study the case where both firms are socially concerned. As a result, we enlarge the analysis started by Goering (2012) and get further interesting insights into a bilateral monopoly with corporate social responsibility. First, we are able to summarize ‘Proposition 1’ and ‘Proposition 4’ into a common one and figure out the circumstances when the wholesale price fixed by the manufacturer is below marginal costs. Second, we explain analytically the findings from ‘Proposition 3’ and ‘Proposition 6’. We point out the model's key assumption – the perfectly coordinated marketing channel – as the driver of the results and the reason for the equilibrium results' independence from retailer's social concern.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abel P. Jeuland & Steven M. Shugan, 1983. "Managing Channel Profits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 239-272.
- Kopel, Michael & Brand, Björn, 2012. "Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 982-989.
- Goering, Gregory E., 2012. "Corporate social responsibility and marketing channel coordination," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 142-148.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, July.
- Gregory E. Goering, 2007. "The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 83-91.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:67:y:2013:i:4:p:324-327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.