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What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods

  • Bruni, Camilla
  • Nuño, Juan Carlos
  • Primicerio, Mario
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    We investigate optimal strategies to defend valuable goods against the attacks of a thief. Given the value of the goods and the probability of success for the thief, we look for the strategy that assures the largest benefit to each player irrespective of the strategy of his opponent. Two complementary approaches are used: agent-based modeling and game theory. It is shown that the compromise between the value of the goods and the probability of success defines the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game, that is compared with the results of the agent-based simulations and discussed in terms of the system parameters.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437112008825
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.

    Volume (Year): 392 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 840-850

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:392:y:2013:i:4:p:840-850
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/

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    1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521772518 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Luciano Andreozzi, 2004. "Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 69-82, October.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521775908 is not listed on IDEAS
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