Cooperation and community structure in social networks
Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society. One way of studying these important phenomena is by using simplified models of individual behavior under conflicting situations such as evolutionary game theory. Starting from the observation that individuals interact through networks of acquaintances, we study the evolution of cooperation on model and real social networks through well known paradigmatic games. Using a new payoff scheme which leaves replicator dynamics invariant, we find that cooperation is sustainable in such networks, even in the difficult case of the prisoner’s dilemma. The evolution and stability of cooperation implies the condensation of game strategies into the existing community structures of the social network in which clusters of cooperators survive thanks to their higher connectivity towards other fellow cooperators.
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Volume (Year): 387 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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