IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v63y2014icp1-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from credit score cutoff rules

Author

Listed:
  • Bubb, Ryan
  • Kaufman, Alex

Abstract

A growing literature exploits credit score cutoff rules as a natural experiment to estimate the moral hazard effect of securitization on lender screening. However, these cutoff rules can be traced to underwriting guidelines for originators, not for securitizers. Moreover, loan-level data reveal that lenders change their screening at credit score cutoffs in the absence of changes in the probability of securitization. Credit score cutoff rules thus cannot be used to learn about the moral hazard effect of securitization on underwriting. By showing that this evidence has been misinterpreted, our analysis should move beliefs away from the conclusion that securitization led to lax screening.

Suggested Citation

  • Bubb, Ryan & Kaufman, Alex, 2014. "Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from credit score cutoff rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-18.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:63:y:2014:i:c:p:1-18
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.01.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393214000178
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Constantine E. Frangakis & Donald B. Rubin, 2002. "Principal Stratification in Causal Inference," Biometrics, The International Biometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 21-29, March.
    2. Christopher L. Foote & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2012. "Why did so many people make so many ex post bad decisions? the causes of the foreclosure crisis," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2012-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Keys, Benjamin J. & Mukherjee, Tanmoy & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2009. "Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 700-720, July.
    4. Kristopher Gerardi & Andreas Lehnert & Shane M. Sherlund & Paul Willen, 2008. "Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(2 (Fall)), pages 69-159.
    5. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    6. Gary Gorton, 2009. "The Subprime Panic," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 15(1), pages 10-46, January.
    7. Benjamin J. Keys & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2071-2108.
    8. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    9. John Krainer & Elizabeth Laderman, 2009. "Mortgage loan securitization and relative loan performance," Working Paper Series 2009-22, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    10. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen & David Hao Zhang, 2020. "Mortgage Prepayment, Race, and Monetary Policy," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2020-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. Tobias Berg & Daniel Streitz & Michael Wedow, 2015. "Real Effects of Securitization," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1514, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Chris Cunningham & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Yannan Shen, 2017. "Fracking and Mortgage Default," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2017-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. Paul S. Calem & Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Leonard I. Nakamura, 2017. "Appraising Home Purchase Appraisals," Working Papers 17-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Stephen D. Oliner & Morris A. Davis & Will Larson, 2019. "Mortgage risk since 1990," AEI Economics Working Papers 1001502, American Enterprise Institute.
    6. Sander Gerritsen & Bas ter Weel & Dinand Webbink, 2016. "Sorting around the discontinuity threshold: The case of a neighbourhood investment programme," CPB Discussion Paper 329.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    7. W. Scott Frame & Larry Wall & Lawrence J. White, 2018. "Technological Change and Financial Innovation in Banking: Some Implications for FinTech," Working Papers 18-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. Fabio Panetta & Alberto Franco Pozzolo, 2018. "Why do banks securitise their assets? Bank-level evidence from over one hundred countries in the pre-crisis period," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1183, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Christopher L. Foote & Paul S. Willen, 2018. "Mortgage-Default Research and the Recent Foreclosure Crisis," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 10(1), pages 59-100, November.
    10. Bronson Argyle & Taylor D. Nadauld & Christopher Palmer, 2020. "Real Effects of Search Frictions in Consumer Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 26645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Ronel Elul, 2015. "Securitization and mortgage default," Working Papers 15-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    12. Fernando Ferreira & Joseph Gyourko, 2015. "A New Look at the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis: Panel Data Evidence of Prime and Subprime Borrowers from 1997 to 2012," NBER Working Papers 21261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Steven Laufer & Andrew D. Paciorek, 2016. "The Effects of Mortgage Credit Availability : Evidence from Minimum Credit Score Lending Rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-098, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. International Monetary Fund, 2015. "United States; Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2015/169, International Monetary Fund.
    15. W. Scott Frame, 2018. "Agency Conflicts In Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does The Empirical Literature Tell Us?," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 237-251, June.
    16. Zhao, Yunhui, 2016. "Got Hurt for What You Paid? Revisiting Government Subsidy in the U.S. Mortgage Market," MPRA Paper 81083, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Aug 2017.
    17. Gerritsen, Sander & Webbink, Dinand & ter Weel, Bas, 2016. "Sorting around the Discontinuity Threshold: The Case of a Neighbourhood Investment Programme," IZA Discussion Papers 9838, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Andra Ghent & Rossen Valkanov, 2016. "Comparing Securitized and Balance Sheet Loans: Size Matters," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2784-2803, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Davis, Morris A. & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2015. "Housing, Finance, and the Macroeconomy," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 753-811, Elsevier.
    2. Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, 2011. "Securitization and moral hazard: evidence from credit score cutoff rules," Public Policy Discussion Paper 11-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    3. Sruthi Davuluri & René García Franceschini & Christopher R. Knittel & Chikara Onda & Kelly Roache, 2019. "Machine Learning for Solar Accessibility: Implications for Low-Income Solar Expansion and Profitability," NBER Working Papers 26178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Patir, Assaf, 2017. "Securitization, bank vigilance, leverage and sudden stops," MPRA Paper 81463, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.
    6. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    7. Adelino, Manuel & Scott Frame, W. & Gerardi, Kristopher, 2017. "The effect of large investors on asset quality: Evidence from subprime mortgage securities," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-51.
    8. Agarwal, Sumit & Chang, Yan & Yavas, Abdullah, 2012. "Adverse selection in mortgage securitization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 640-660.
    9. Robert Shimer, 2014. "Private Information in the Mortgage Market: Evidence and a Theory of Crises," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Sofía Bauducco & Lawrence Christiano & Claudio Raddatz (ed.),Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: challenges for Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 19, chapter 4, pages 117-150, Central Bank of Chile.
    10. W. Scott Frame, 2018. "Agency Conflicts In Residential Mortgage Securitization: What Does The Empirical Literature Tell Us?," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 237-251, June.
    11. José María Liberti & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2018. "Information: Hard and Soft," NBER Working Papers 25075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ugo Albertazzi & Ginette Eramo & Leonardo Gambacorta & Carmelo Salleo, 2011. "Securitization is not that evil after all," BIS Working Papers 341, Bank for International Settlements.
    13. Andreas G.F. Hoepner & John O.S. Wilson, 2012. "Social, Environmental, Ethical and Trust (SEET) Issues in Banking: An Overview," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 24, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Khandani, Amir E. & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C., 2013. "Systemic risk and the refinancing ratchet effect," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 29-45.
    15. José María Liberti, 2018. "Initiative, Incentives, and Soft Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3714-3734, August.
    16. W. Scott Frame & Larry Wall & Lawrence J. White, 2018. "Technological Change and Financial Innovation in Banking: Some Implications for FinTech," Working Papers 18-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    17. Fabio Panetta & Alberto Franco Pozzolo, 2018. "Why do banks securitise their assets? Bank-level evidence from over one hundred countries in the pre-crisis period," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1183, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    18. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 2010. "Unstable banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 306-318, September.
    19. Daxuan Zhao & Yonglin Wang & Tien Foo Sing, 2019. "Impact of Foreclosure Laws on Mortgage Loan Supply and Performance," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 159-200, February.
    20. Kiff, John & Kisser, Michael, 2014. "A shot at regulating securitization," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 32-49.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:63:y:2014:i:c:p:1-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nithya Sathishkumar). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.