The Arrow paradox with fuzzy preferences
This note considers a new factorization of a fuzzy weak binary preference relation into its asymmetric and symmetric parts. Arrow's General Possibility Theorem is then examined within the resulting framework of vague individual and social preferences. The outcome of this exercise is compared with some earlier results available in the literature on the Arrow paradox with fuzzy preferences.
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- Richard Barrett & Maurice Salles, 2006. "Social Choice With Fuzzy Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200615, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Gregory Richardson, 1998. "The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 359-369.
- Dutta, Bhaskan, 1987. "Fuzzy preferences and social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 215-229, June.
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