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Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Perote Pena
  • Ashley Piggins

    (Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway)

Abstract

We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Perote Pena & Ashley Piggins, 2005. "Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules," Working Papers 0098, National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0098
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    File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105
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    File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2017. "Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized. Part one: general agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 747-786, April.
    2. Conal Duddy & Juan Perote-Peña & Ashley Piggins, 2010. "Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(3), pages 411-428, March.
    3. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Conal Duddy & Juan Perote-Peña & Ashley Piggins, 2011. "Arrow’s theorem and max-star transitivity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 25-34, January.
    5. Piggins, Ashley & Duddy, Conal, 2016. "Oligarchy and soft incompleteness," MPRA Paper 72392, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins, 2018. "On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(4), pages 717-735, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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