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Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences

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  • Peter Casey
  • Mark Wierman
  • Michael Gibilisco
  • John Mordeson
  • Terry Clark

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Suggested Citation

  • Peter Casey & Mark Wierman & Michael Gibilisco & John Mordeson & Terry Clark, 2012. "Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 409-423, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:151:y:2012:i:3:p:409-423
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9751-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gregory Richardson, 1998. "The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 359-369.
    2. Jonathan B. Slapin & Sven‐Oliver Proksch, 2008. "A Scaling Model for Estimating Time‐Series Party Positions from Texts," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 705-722, July.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskan, 1987. "Fuzzy preferences and social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 215-229, June.
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
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