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On the allocation of criminal activity to ensure its social benefits

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  • Baumol, William J.

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  • Baumol, William J., 2010. "On the allocation of criminal activity to ensure its social benefits," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 662-669, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:32:y::i:5:p:662-669
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "A Tale of “Benevolent” Governments: Private Credit Markets, Public Finance, and the Role of Jewish Lenders in Medieval and Renaissance Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 164-189, March.
    2. Barzel, Yoram, 1992. "Confiscation by the Ruler: The Rise and Fall of Jewish Lending in the Middle Ages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 1-13, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kollias, Christos & Mylonidis, Nikolaos & Paleologou, Suzanna-Maria, 2013. "Crime and the effectiveness of public order spending in Greece: Policy implications of some persistent findings," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 121-133.

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