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Symposium on The Structure of Modern Markets

Author

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  • Dassiou, Xeni
  • Glycopantis, Dionysius

Abstract

We look at modern markets and discuss their current treatment by policy makers, analyzing policy recommendations regarding the treatment of such markets in the future. These include recommendations regarding the taxation treatment of informal markets; the presence of market power and anti-competitive strategies in health markets and platform two-sided markets; investment and arbitrage functions in foreign exchange markets; regulation and competition in the Canadian banking sector; asymmetric regulation in mobile termination charges and technological diffusion; incentive regulation in telecoms and its impact on productive efficiency; welfare enhancing government intervention recommendations in broadcasting. Finally, we give an overview of the overall success of the UK Competition Commission as a second stage enforcer of regulatory policy and competition law.

Suggested Citation

  • Dassiou, Xeni & Glycopantis, Dionysius, 2009. "Symposium on The Structure of Modern Markets," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joecas:v:6:y:2009:i:2:p:1-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeca.2009.02.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2007. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1703-1730, December.
    2. Peitz, Martin, 2005. "Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 341-358, February.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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