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When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

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  • Massa, Massimo
  • Reuter, Jonathan
  • Zitzewitz, Eric

Abstract

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.

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  • Massa, Massimo & Reuter, Jonathan & Zitzewitz, Eric, 2010. "When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 400-424, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:95:y:2010:i:3:p:400-424
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wsi:qjfxxx:v:07:y:2017:i:03:n:s2010139217500094 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Diane Del Guercio & Jonathan Reuter & Paula A. Tkac, 2010. "Broker Incentives and Mutual Fund Market Segmentation," NBER Working Papers 16312, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Diane Del Guercio & Jonathan Reuter, 2014. "Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(4), pages 1673-1704, August.
    4. Galkiewicz, Dominika Paula, 2014. "Manager Characteristics and Credit Derivative Use by U.S. Corporate Bond Funds," Discussion Papers in Economics 24445, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Michaela Bär & Alexander Kempf & Stefan Ruenzi, 2010. "Is a Team Different from the Sum of its Parts? Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 359-396.
    6. Mercedes Alda, 2016. "Manager Characteristics and Manager-Replacement: How Is Pension Fund Performance Affected?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 66(2), pages 161-180, April.
    7. Dass, Nishant & Nanda, Vikram & Wang, Qinghai, 2013. "Allocation of decision rights and the investment strategy of mutual funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 254-277.
    8. Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(1), pages 44-69, March.
    9. Jonathan Reuter & Eric Zitzewitz, 2010. "How Much Does Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach," NBER Working Papers 16329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Cici, Gjergji & Rosenfeld, Claire, 2012. "The investment abilities of mutual fund buy-side analysts," CFR Working Papers 12-07, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    11. Bessler, Wolfgang & Blake, David & Lückoff, Peter & Tonks, Ian, 2010. "Why does mutual fund performance not persist? The impact and interaction of fund flows and manager changes," MPRA Paper 34185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Cici, Gjergji & Rosenfeld, Claire, 2016. "A study of analyst-run mutual funds: The abilities and roles of buy-side analysts," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 8-29.
    13. patel, saurin & sarkissian, sergei, 2012. "To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual Funds," MPRA Paper 38496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin, 2013. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    15. Fang, Jieyan & Kempf, Alexander & Trapp, Monika, 2012. "Fund manager allocation," CFR Working Papers 10-04 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    16. Cici, Gjergji, 2011. "The prevalence of the disposition effect in mutual funds' trades," CFR Working Papers 11-05 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    17. Theeke, Matt, 2016. "The effects of internal and external competition on innovation breadth," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(9), pages 3324-3331.
    18. Dominika Paula Gałkiewicz, 2015. "Manager Characteristics and Credit Derivative Use by U.S. Corporate Bond Funds," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2015-018, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    19. Hornstein, Abigail S. & Hounsell, James, 2016. "Managerial investment in mutual funds: Determinants and performance implications," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 18-34.
    20. Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin & Mullally, Kevin, 2015. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    21. Clemens Sialm & T. Mandy Tham, 2016. "Spillover Effects in Mutual Fund Companies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1472-1486, May.
    22. Cici, Gjergji, 2011. "The relation of the disposition effect to mutual fund trades and performance," CFR Working Papers 11-05, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    23. Galkiewicz, Dominika Paula, 2014. "Manager Characteristics and Credit Derivative Use by U.S. Corporate Bond Funds," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 495, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    24. Jun Huang & Albert Y. Wang, 2015. "The Predictability of Managerial Heterogeneities in Mutual Funds," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 947-979, October.
    25. repec:eee:jfinec:v:127:y:2018:i:3:p:567-587 is not listed on IDEAS

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