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Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language

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  • Blume, Andreas

Abstract

This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from the premise that one of language’s central characteristics is to provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a rich and changing environment, language will be incomplete. This encourages reliance on structure. It is shown how creative language use emerges form common knowledge structures, even if those structures are consistent with an a priori absence of a common language. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Koordination und Lernen mit einer Partialsprache) In diesem Beitrag wird die Anwendung von Strukturen in einer Sprache aus Effizienzsicht begründet. Der Artikel geht davon aus, daß eines der wichtigsten Merkmale der Sprache in ihrer Kreativität zu sehen ist, d. h. als Mittel, um Neues über neue Sachverhalte auszusagen. Es ist deshalb zu erwarten, daß in einer vielfältigen und sich verändernden Umwelt die Sprache unvollständig bleiben wird. Dies fördert die Anwendung von Strukturen. Es wird gezeigt, wie die kreative Sprachanwendung aus allgemeinen Wissensstrukturen entsteht, auch dann, wenn diese Strukturen a priori noch keine gemeinsame Sprache bilden.
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  • Blume, Andreas, 2000. "Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 1-36, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:95:y:2000:i:1:p:1-36
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