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Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents

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  • Parreiras, Sergio O.

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  • Parreiras, Sergio O., 2005. "Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 210-217, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:123:y:2005:i:2:p:210-217
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
    2. Michael Peters, 2001. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(3), pages 613-631.
    3. Robert, Jacques, 1991. "Continuity in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 169-179, October.
    4. Cremer, Jacques, 1982. "A simple proof of Blackwell's "comparison of experiments" theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 439-443, August.
    5. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    6. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
    7. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Obara Ichiro, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, March.
    2. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
    3. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 2010. "Information acquisition and full surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2282-2308, November.
    4. Sushil Bikhchandani & Ichiro Obara, 2017. "Mechanism design with information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(3), pages 783-812, March.
    5. Bose, Subir & Zhao, Jinhua, 2007. "Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 357-381, July.
    6. Anil Arya & Joel Demski & Jonathan Glover & Pierre Liang, 2009. "Quasi-Robust Multiagent Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 752-762, May.
    7. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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