Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
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- Michael Peters, 2001. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 613-631.
- Neeman, Z., 1998.
"The Relevance of Private Infromation in Mechanism Design,"
93, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
- Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996.
"A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms,"
peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Cremer, Jacques, 1982. "A simple proof of Blackwell's "comparison of experiments" theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 439-443, August.
- Robert, Jacques, 1991. "Continuity in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 169-179, October.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
- McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
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