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Unions as commitment devices

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  • Eguchi, Kyota

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  • Eguchi, Kyota, 2002. "Unions as commitment devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 407-421, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:47:y:2002:i:4:p:407-421
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Valletta, Robert G, 1993. "Union Effects on Municipal Employment and Wages: A Longitudinal Approach," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(3), pages 545-574, July.
    2. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Toshiaki Tachibanaki, 1998. "Introduction to Wage Differentials: An International Comparison," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Toshiaki Tachibanaki (ed.), Wage Differentials, chapter 1, pages 1-34, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Tsuyoshi Tsuru & James B. Rebitzer, 1995. "The Limits of Enterprise Unionism: Prospects for Continuing Union Decline in Japan," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 459-492, September.
    5. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
    6. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-1054.
    7. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    8. Giorgio Brunello, 1992. "The Effect of Unions on Firm Performance in Japanese Manufacturing," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(3), pages 471-487, April.
    9. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 541-555.
    10. Farber, Henry S, 1990. "The Decline of Unionization in the United States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(1), pages 75-105, January.
    11. Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 151-164.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uwe JIRJAHN & Stephen C. SMITH, 2018. "Nonunion Employee Representation: Theory And The German Experience With Mandated Works Councils," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 201-233, March.
    2. Fathi Fakhfakh & Virginie Pérotin & Andrew Robinson, 2011. "Workplace Change and Productivity: Does Employee Voice Make a Difference?," Chapters, in: Susan Hayter (ed.), The Role of Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:201-233 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Laroche, Patrice, 2020. "Unions, Collective Bargaining and Firm Performance," GLO Discussion Paper Series 728, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    5. Eguchi, Kyota, 2014. "Employment protection and incentives: Severance pay vs. procedural inconvenience," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 272-290.

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