IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jaecon/v29y2000i3p261-286.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Purchase versus pooling in stock-for-stock acquisitions: Why do firms care?

Author

Listed:
  • Aboody, David
  • Kasznik, Ron
  • Williams, Michael

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Aboody, David & Kasznik, Ron & Williams, Michael, 2000. "Purchase versus pooling in stock-for-stock acquisitions: Why do firms care?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 261-286, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:261-286
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4101(00)00023-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kroll, Mark & Simmons, Susan A. & Wright, Peter, 1990. "Determinants of chief executive officer compensation following major acquisitions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 349-366, June.
    2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    3. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Dechow, Patricia M. & Sloan, Richard G., 1991. "Executive incentives and the horizon problem : An empirical investigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 51-89.
    5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    6. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 167-198.
    7. DeFond, Mark L. & Jiambalvo, James, 1994. "Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 145-176.
    8. Press, Eric G. & Weintrop, Joseph B., 1990. "Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt agreements : Their association with leverage and impact on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 65-95.
    9. Sweeney, Amy Patricia, 1994. "Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 281-308.
    10. DeAngelo, Linda Elizabeth, 1988. "Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance : The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 3-36.
    11. Petry, Glenn & Settle, John, 1991. "Relationship of takeover gains to the stake of managers in the acquiring firm," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, pages 99-114.
    12. repec:bla:joares:v:36:y:1998:i:2:p:279-298 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Barth, Mary E. & Kasznik, Ron, 1999. "Share repurchases and intangible assets," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 211-241.
    14. Nathan, Kevin, 1988. "Do firms pay to pool?: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 185-200.
    15. Fields, Thomas D. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Vincent, Linda, 2001. "Empirical research on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 255-307, September.
    16. Healy, Paul M. & Kang, Sok-Hyon & Palepu, Krishna G., 1987. "The effect of accounting procedure changes on CEOs' cash salary and bonus compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 7-34.
    17. Aboody, David & Kasznik, Ron, 2000. "CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 73-100.
    18. Duke, Joanne C. & Hunt, Herbert III, 1990. "An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and accounting-related debt proxies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 45-63.
    19. Clifford W. Smith Jr. & Ross L. Watts, 1982. "Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 7(2), pages 139-157, December.
    20. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 85-107.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dos Santos, Marcelo B. & Errunza, Vihang R. & Miller, Darius P., 2008. "Does corporate international diversification destroy value? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2716-2724, December.
    2. Weber, Joseph P., 2004. "Shareholder wealth effects of pooling-of-interests accounting: evidence from the SEC's restriction on share repurchases following pooling transactions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-57, February.
    3. Gao, Ning, 2011. "The adverse selection effect of corporate cash reserve: Evidence from acquisitions solely financed by stock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 789-808, September.
    4. Robin Wilber, 2007. "Why do firms repurchase stock to acquire another firm?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 155-172, August.
    5. Malmendier, Ulrike & Opp, Marcus M. & Saidi, Farzad, 2016. "Target revaluation after failed takeover attempts: Cash versus stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 92-106.
    6. Skinner, Douglas J., 2008. "Discussion of "The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting"," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 282-288, August.
    7. Richardson, Scott & Tuna, A. Irem & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices," Working papers 4307-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    8. Duso, Tomaso & Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, Burcin, 2010. "Is the event study methodology useful for merger analysis? A comparison of stock market and accounting data," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 186-192, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:261-286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.