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Exclusionary vertical contracts with multiple entrants

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  • Kitamura, Hiroshi

Abstract

This paper constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing in the presence of multiple entrants. Unlike the single-entrant model in previous literature, an entrant competes not only with the incumbent to deal with buyers but also with other entrants. The competition among entrants then serves as a commitment such that low wholesale prices are offered to buyers when they deviate from exclusive contracts. We argue that this commitment effect becomes a barrier to exclusive dealing and that the results differ drastically from the predictions of the single-entrant framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Kitamura, Hiroshi, 2010. "Exclusionary vertical contracts with multiple entrants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 213-219, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:28:y:2010:i:3:p:213-219
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
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    12. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
    13. David Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2007. "Exclusive contracts foster relationship-specific investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(1), pages 85-97, March.
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    15. Andrea Shepard, 1987. "Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 360-368, Autumn.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kitamura Hiroshi, 2011. "Exclusive Contracts under Financial Constraints," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, September.
    2. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2024. "How Does Downstream Firms’ Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(2), pages 219-242, March.
    3. Elhauge, Einer & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2015. "Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 111-121.
    4. Gratz, Linda & Reisinger, Markus, 2013. "On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 429-437.
    5. Muriel Fadairo & Jianyu Yu, 2014. "Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing ; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks," Working Papers 1405, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    6. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2018. "Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition," ISER Discussion Paper 1021, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    7. Mikko Packalen, 2011. "Market Share Exclusion," Working Papers 1103, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2011.
    8. Hiroshi Kitamura & Misato Sato & Koki Arai, 2014. "Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 47-60, May.
    9. repec:dpr:wpaper:0878 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Fadairo, Muriel & Yu, Jianyu & Lanchimba, Cintya, 2017. "The Choice of Exclusive Dealing: Economic Rationales and Evidence from French Retail Chains," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 317-335.
    11. repec:dpr:wpaper:0918 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
    13. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2023. "Which is better for durable goods producers, exclusive or open supply chain?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 158-176, January.
    14. Yongmin Chen & David E. M. Sappington, 2011. "Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 194-220, May.
    15. Hiroshi Kitamura & Akira Miyaoka & Misato Sato, 2016. "Relationship-specific investment as a barrier to entry," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 119(1), pages 17-45, September.
    16. Ke Liu & Xiaoxuan Meng, 2021. "Exclusive dealing when upstream displacement is possible," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 830-843, November.
    17. Chul-Hi Park & Toshihiro Matsumura & Sang-Ho Lee, 2022. "Procurement of advanced inputs and welfare-reducing vertical integration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 255-283, April.
    18. Gratz, Linda & Reisinger, Markus, 2012. "Can Naked Exclusion Be Procompetitive?," Discussion Papers in Economics 12733, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    19. Lee, Sang-Ho & Matsumura, Toshihiro & Park, Chul-Hi, 2017. "Procurement of Advanced Technology and Welfare-Reducing Vertical Integration," MPRA Paper 79109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021. "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 337-375, July.
    21. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2021. "Defending home against giants: Exclusive dealing as a survival strategy for local firms," ISER Discussion Paper 1122, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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