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Too many goals: Problems with the 700Â MHz auction

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  • Bazelon, Coleman
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    In early 2008, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) conducted its largest auction of radio spectrum licenses. The auctioned 700Â MHz spectrum bands represented a large part of the US's digital dividend, which was created by transitioning to more efficient digital television broadcasts. The FCC set out to accomplish many laudable goals with the 700Â MHz auction such as promoting new entry and rural deployments in wireless broadband, creating a band of commercial spectrum with requirements for open access, and creating a nationwide interoperable public safety network. Unfortunately, poor 700Â MHz band license configurations and auction rules for their assignment prevented the FCC from meeting most of its goals. The two largest national wireless incumbents won most of the licensed frequencies so there will be no new national entrants, rural build-out is unlikely to be promoted, and the spectrum band set aside to aid the development of a public-private partnership for public safety is still unassigned. Furthermore, the large variation in prices within the auction does not support the notion that the auction assigned licenses efficiently.

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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Information Economics and Policy.

    Volume (Year): 21 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 115-127

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:115-127
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    1. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, 2009. "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions," NBER Working Papers 14765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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