Purchasing health care in China: Competing or non-competing third-party purchasers?
Objectives China's government has decided to increase government funding by 1-1.5% of the Gross Domestic Products in the health care sector. However, it is still a question how to turn the new funding into efficient health care.Methods To help to answer this question we analyze three prototype models of organizing the health care system that may be relevant for China, namely the "Government provision model", the "regulated market with non-competing third-party purchasers", and the "regulated market with competing third-party purchasers". The pre- and post-reform English health care system and the present Dutch health care system are used as examples of the three models. During the last 20 years these countries had, just as China, major health care reforms from a national centrally planned system to a market-based system. Based on the experiences in these countries we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of these three prototype models and discuss their relevance for China.Results and conclusions We conclude that the creation of prudent third-party purchasers, who have the incentive and ability to act on behalf of individual consumers, is a critical success factor, whatever model China chooses to implement.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998.
"Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July.
- Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1995. "Contracting for health services with unmonitored quality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9510, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Hsiao, William C., 2007. "The political economy of Chinese health reform," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 241-249, July.
- Eggleston, Karen & Ling, Li & Qingyue, Meng & Lindelow, Magnus & Wagstaff, Adam, 2006.
"Health Service Delivery in China: A Literature Review,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3978, The World Bank.
- Karen Eggleston & Li Ling & Meng Qingyue & Magnus Lindelow & Adam Wagstaff, 2008. "Health service delivery in China: a literature review," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 149-165.
- van de Ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Schut, Frederik T. & Rutten, Frans F.H., 1994. "Forming and reforming the market for third-party purchasing of health care," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 1405-1412, November.
- Wagstaff, Adam & Lindelow, Magnus, 2008.
"Can insurance increase financial risk?: The curious case of health insurance in China,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 990-1005, July.
- Wagstaff, Adam & Lindelow, Magnus, 2005. "Can insurance increase financial risk ? The curious case of health insurance in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3741, The World Bank.
- Liu, Yuanli, 2002. "Reforming China's urban health insurance system," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 133-150, May.
- Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1996. "Competition in NHS Quasi-markets," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 89-99, Winter.
- Maynard, Alan, 1994. "Can competition enhance efficiency in health care? Lessons from the reform of the U.K. National Health Service," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 1433-1445, November.
- Enthoven, Alain C., 1994. "On the ideal market structure for third-party purchasing of health care," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 1413-1424, November.
- Mark Dusheiko & Maria Goddard & Hugh Gravelle & Rowena Jacobs, 2008. "Explaining trends in concentration of healthcare commissioning in the English NHS," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(8), pages 907-926.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:92:y:2009:i:2-3:p:305-312. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)or ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.