Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
In our model, it is assumed that each agent knows the sum of the utility functions of the entire society as well as his own utility. Under this information assumption a social choice mechanism has to make a public decision and choose a balanced set of side payments. The mechanisms providing for stability against coalitational manipulation are shown to be egalitarian. An extension of an arbitrary egalitarian mechanism to a set of inconsistent messages is given in an explicit form. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D82.
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