On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
This note shows that, for the combinatorial market goods defined by Wellman et al. (2001), there may not exist an optimal allocation that is in equilibrium. Moreover, this result holds even if the value of each processed job is independent of its completion time. The proposed algorithm for finding an equilibrium allocation, using an assignment model, fails due to complementarity, even for instances that admit an optimal allocation which is in equilibrium.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Ostroy, Joseph M., 2002. "The Package Assignment Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 377-406, December.
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