IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v26y2018icp255-260.html

Credit default swaps and regulatory capital relief: Evidence from European banks

Author

Listed:
  • Thornton, John
  • Tommaso, Caterina di

Abstract

In a sample of European banks, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) are used for regulatory arbitrage to lower capital requirements and facilitate greater risk taking. Moreover, CDS-using banks generate higher returns on capital from the lower risk weighted assets they hold relative to banks that do not use CDS.

Suggested Citation

  • Thornton, John & Tommaso, Caterina di, 2018. "Credit default swaps and regulatory capital relief: Evidence from European banks," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 255-260.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:26:y:2018:i:c:p:255-260
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.02.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612317305913
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2018.02.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:2:p:375-96 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena, 2006. "Credit risk transfer and contagion," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 89-111, January.
    3. Jill Cetina & John McDonough & Sriram Rajan, 2015. "More Transparency Needed For Bank Capital Relief Trades," Briefs 15-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    4. William R. Cline, 2017. "The Right Balance for Banks: Theory and Evidence on Optimal Capital Requirements," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 7212, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fiedor, Paweł & Killeen, Neill, 2021. "Securitisation special purpose entities, bank sponsors and derivatives," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    2. Alessandra Ortolano & Eliana Angelini, 2022. "Eurozone Crisis and Banks’ Creditworthiness: What is New for Credit Default Swap Spread Determinants?," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 23(4), pages 911-924, August.
    3. González-Fernández, Marcos & González-Velasco, Carmen, 2020. "An alternative approach to predicting bank credit risk in Europe with Google data," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
    4. Caterina Di Tommaso, 2022. "Securitization and CDS in U.S. bank lending," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 1120-1133, January.
    5. Tabassum & Mohammad Yameen, 2024. "Why do banks use credit default swaps (CDS)? A systematic review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 201-231, February.
    6. Miao Tang & Hong Fan, 2025. "Dynamic Multilayer Network for Systemic Risk and Bank Regulation Based on CDS," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 65(2), pages 691-715, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tongurai, Jittima & Vithessonthi, Chaiporn, 2018. "The impact of the banking sector on economic structure and growth," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 193-207.
    2. Nicole Boyson & Jean Helwege & Jan Jindra, 2014. "Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 857-884, December.
    3. Oehmke, Martin & Zawadowski, Adam, 2015. "Synthetic or real? The equilibrium effects of credit default swaps on bond markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 84511, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Kim, Teakdong & Koo, Bonwoo & Park, Minsoo, 2013. "Role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 662-672.
    5. Maarten van Oordt, 2017. "Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Insolvency Risk," Staff Working Papers 17-59, Bank of Canada.
    6. Allen, Franklin & Gu, Xian, 2018. "The Interplay between Regulations and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 12862, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    7. Liliana Eva Donath & Gabriela Mircea & Mihaela Neamțu & Grațiela Georgiana Noja & Nicoleta Sîrghi, 2024. "The Effect of Network Delay and Contagion on Mobile Banking Users: A Dynamical Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-22, November.
    8. Nicolò, Antonio & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2008. "Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 444-463, October.
    9. Viral V. Acharya & Hamid Mehran & Anjan V. Thakor, 2016. "Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There Is Rent Seeking and Risk Shifting," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(1), pages 36-75.
    10. Fabio Castiglionesi & Fabio Feriozzi & Guido Lorenzoni, 2019. "Financial Integration and Liquidity Crises," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 955-975, March.
    11. Neyer, Ulrike & Sterzel, André, 2017. "Capital requirements for government bonds: Implications for bank behaviour and financial stability," DICE Discussion Papers 275, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    12. Xiao, Shuhua & Zhu, Shushang & Wu, Ying, 2023. "Asset securitization, cross holdings, and systemic risk in banking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    13. James R. Thompson, 2007. "Credit Risk Transfer: To Sell Or To Insure," Working Paper 1131, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    14. Ahn, Jung-Hyun & Breton, Régis, 2014. "Securitization, competition and monitoring," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 195-210.
    15. Tingqiang Chen & Binqing Xiao & Haifei Liu, 2018. "Credit Risk Contagion in an Evolving Network Model Integrating Spillover Effects and Behavioral Interventions," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, March.
    16. Budnik, Katarzyna & Dimitrov, Ivan & Giglio, Carla & Groß, Johannes & Lampe, Max & Sarychev, Andrei & Tarbé, Matthieu & Vagliano, Gianluca & Volk, Matjaz, 2021. "The growth-at-risk perspective on the system-wide impact of Basel III finalisation in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 258, European Central Bank.
    17. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, 2010. "An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions-super-," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 10(s1), pages 1-26.
    18. Niedrig, Tobias, 2015. "Optimal asset allocation for interconnected life insurers in the low interest rate environment under solvency regulation," SAFE Working Paper Series 97, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    19. Ongena, Steven & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2011. "Securitization and lending standards: evidence from the wholesale loan market," Working Paper Series 1362, European Central Bank.
    20. Christian Kubitza, 2021. "Tackling the Volatility Paradox: Spillover Persistence and Systemic Risk," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 079, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:26:y:2018:i:c:p:255-260. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.