Effect of demand management on regulated and deregulated electricity sectors
Our society derives a quantifiable benefit from electric power. In particular, forced outages or blackouts have enormous consequences on society, one of which is loss of economic surplus. The society relies on having a continuous supply of electrical energy. Some customers may willingly risk this continuous supply and participate in demand management programs for electrical power. If the power system grid is in trouble, electric utilities need to have demand relief. Customers willing to reduce their demand to help the system can receive an incentive fee for helping the utilities. Demand relief can be system wide or location specific. Sometimes it can be more effective to fix the electrical demand vs. supply imbalance from the demand side. The value of demand management contracts is greatly affected by customer location. Inclusion of locational attributes into the contract design procedure increases the effectiveness of the contracts by helping a utility get more value from its demand management programs. Independent System Operators and regulators, among others, can also benefit from effective demand management. This paper will investigate how this type of demand management contracts can help the electricity sector both in regulated and deregulated environments.
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