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Bounded rationality in one-player guessing games

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  • Akhavan Hezaveh, Shahriar

Abstract

This study examines deviations from optimal play in a one-player guessing game with a distance-based payoff function. Nearly half of the observed non-optimal choices follow simple numeric patterns: choosing identical numbers or selecting one as half of the other. These may reflect joint optimization against an unknown target or best-response reasoning as if facing an imagined opponent. Cognitive Reflection Test scores predict behavioral transitions from unstructured to patterned, and from patterned to optimal choices. The findings suggest that many seemingly suboptimal decisions reflect structured, payoff-sensitive reasoning shaped by how participants internally represent the game’s structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Akhavan Hezaveh, Shahriar, 2025. "Bounded rationality in one-player guessing games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004525
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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