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On licensing sequential cost-reducing innovations

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  • Coleff, Joaquín
  • Rubbini, Camilo

Abstract

We present a simple model of an outside innovator licensing sequential innovations and propose a channel through which the prospect of future inventions affects the current number of licenses offered. Innovators may license their inventions to more firms than the one-shot licensing model predicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Coleff, Joaquín & Rubbini, Camilo, 2025. "On licensing sequential cost-reducing innovations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 246(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:246:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524005275
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112043
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tina Kao, 2009. "Strategic Licensing And Sequential Innovations," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 512-551, July.
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    8. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August.
    9. Gordanier, John & Miao, Chun-Hui, 2011. "On the duration of technology licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 755-765.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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