Investment decisions under hidden competition
We present a model adequate for investment decisions in duopolies under total hidden competition. In this competitive context all potential entrants remain unrevealed until they decide to move into the market. The value-functions and the optimal entry thresholds are derived.
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- Bouis, Romain & Huisman, Kuno J.M. & Kort, Peter M., 2009.
"Investment in oligopoly under uncertainty: The accordion effect,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 320-331, March.
- Bouis, R. & Huisman, K.J.M. & Kort, P.M., 2006. "Investment in Oligopoly under Uncertainty : The Accordion Effect," Discussion Paper 2006-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/12655 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kamien,Morton I. & Schwartz,Nancy L., 1982. "Market Structure and Innovation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521293853, December.
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