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Cross-bidding impact throughout the product life cycle

Author

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  • Pages, Juan-Francisco
  • Mochon, Asuncion

Abstract

Two products at different points of the product life cycle have been chosen to analyse the effect of cross-bidding in competing auctions. The findings indicate that this strategy can have a different impact depending on the phase of the cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Pages, Juan-Francisco & Mochon, Asuncion, 2011. "Cross-bidding impact throughout the product life cycle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 80-83, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:80-83
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhuang, Hejun & Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter T.L., 2022. "Optimal seller strategy in overlapping auctions," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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