An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions
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- Andersson, T. & Andersson, C. & Andersson, F., 2012. "An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 99-101.
References listed on IDEAS
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Competing auctions with endogenous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 1-27, July.
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- Andersson, Ola & Andersson, Tommy, 2015.
"Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions,"
Working Paper Series
1085, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Andersson , Ola & Andersson , Tommy, 2015. "Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions," Working Papers 2015:28, Lund University, Department of Economics.
More about this item
KeywordsCompeting auctions; Cross-bidding; Efficiency; Price uniformity;
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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