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An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions

Author

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  • Andersson, Tommy

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Andersson, Christer

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Andersson, Fredrik

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically a number of hypotheses that are related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions for train tickets. The data set is ideal for analyzing competing auctions since each ticket is sold in a separate auction and all auctions with identical tickets starts and ends at exactly the same time. The results unambiguously demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between efficiency and price uniformity on the one hand and the number of submitted cross-bids on the other hand. These findings are in line with what theory suggests.

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, Tommy & Andersson, Christer & Andersson, Fredrik, 2010. "An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions," Working Papers 2010:14, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2010_014
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/Publications/workpap/Papers/WP10_14.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022. "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 45-69, December.
    3. Andersson, Ola & Andersson, Tommy, 2015. "Decomposing the Afternoon Effect: An Empirical Investigation of Sequential Train Ticket Auctions," Working Paper Series 1085, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Heczko, Alexander & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Ott, Marion, 2023. "The benefits of auctioneer competition: Merging auctions and adding auctioneers," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-038, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2017. "Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 39-55, December.
    6. Maslov, Alexander & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022. "Imperfect competition in online auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    7. Thomas Kittsteiner & Marion Ott & Richard Steinberg, 2022. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1130-1137, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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