Vertical integration and right of first refusal
We consider a partially integrated industry and examine the effects of contracts with a right of first refusal, whereby the vertically integrated firm has the option to match a quote from an independent supplier to supply an independent downstream firm.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2003.
"Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
03-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2007. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1321-1339, September.
- Nocke, Volker & White, Lucy, 2004. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4186, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lucy White & Volker Nocke, 2004. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," 2004 Meeting Papers 45, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alberto Salvo, 2010. "Inferring market power under the threat of entry: the case of the Brazilian cement industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 326-350.
- Yongmin Chen, 2000.
"On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0383, Econometric Society.
- Lee, Joon-Suk, 2008. "Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1407-1424, November.
- Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:50-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.