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An experimental investigation of entry cost effects in sealed-bid dollar auctions

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  • Chakravarty, Surajeet
  • Ghosh, Sudeep

Abstract

We experimentally study the effect of entry costs on bidding and entry behavior in common value auctions. We find, with entry costs, players bid lower in first price and higher in second price auctions, compared to no entry fee auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chakravarty, Surajeet & Ghosh, Sudeep, 2011. "An experimental investigation of entry cost effects in sealed-bid dollar auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 122-124, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:2:p:122-124
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James Cox & Sam Dinkin & James Swarthout, 2001. "Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 163-181, October.
    2. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Beil Richard O., 1993. "Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 485-504, July.
    3. Crawford, Vincent & Broseta, Bruno, 1998. "What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 198-225, March.
    4. Drichoutis, Andreas C. & Lazaridis, Panagiotis & Nayga Jr., Rodolfo M., 2008. "The role of reference prices in experimental auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 446-448, June.
    5. Dan Levin & James L. Smith, 2002. "Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 321-350.
    6. Gérard P. Cachon & Colin F. Camerer, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 165-194.
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