Ricardian equivalence for local government bonds: A utility maximization approach
We show that Ricardian equivalence holds for local public finance if and only if subnational units use property taxes. However, for other tax bases, the unique equilibrium has the same economic outcome as in models where districts may not issue debt.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Feldstein, Martin S, 1977. "The Surprising Incidence of a Tax on Pure Rent: A New Answer to an Old Question," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 349-360, April.
- Bailey, Martin J., 1993. "Note on Ricardian equivalence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 437-446, July.
- Akai, Nobuo, 1994. "Ricardian equivalence for local government bonds : Budget constraint approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 191-195.
- Seater, John J, 1993. "Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 142-190, March.
- Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:2:p:148-151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.