The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
Recent literature has established a link between the fully cursed equilibrium and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium. In this note, even the partially cursed equilibrium is shown to correspond to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001.
"Learning to Play Bayesian Games,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
- Topi Miettinen, 2012.
"Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning,"
Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 193-222, May.
- Miettinen, Topi, 2009. "Paying Attention to Payoffs in Analogy-Based Learning," SITE Working Paper Series 7, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2147, David K. Levine.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2008.
"Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations,"
- Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," THEMA Working Papers 2005-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Erik Eyster & Matt Rabin, 2003.
Method and Hist of Econ Thought
- Eyster, Erik & Rabin, Matthew, 2002. "Cursed Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7p2911dn, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Eyster, Erik & Rabin, Matt, 2002. "Cursed Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6xf4782t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-91, September.
- Jehiel, Philippe, 2005.
"Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00754070, HAL.
- Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000106, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jeniel, 2001. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 0003, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:2:p:162-164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.