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The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders

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  • von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf
  • Schnitzler, Jan

Abstract

We conduct a large-sample analysis of investor activism in the US based on all 13D filings from 2001 to 2016. While hedge funds represent the largest filer group, the sample contains a diverse set of other activist shareholders. This raises the question to what extent other investors perform a governance role similar to hedge funds. Based on target firms' outcome variables, like announcement returns of activist campaigns and changes in operating performance measures, we find surprisingly few differences. However, hedge funds play a special role when it comes towards takeovers. They stimulate monitoring activities among relatively larger firms and they help to set payout policies.

Suggested Citation

  • von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf & Schnitzler, Jan, 2020. "The anatomy of block accumulations by activist shareholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:62:y:2020:i:c:s092911992030064x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101620
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investor activism; Activist blockholders; Hedge funds; Stock ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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