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Surrounding information consideration promotes cooperation in Prisoner’s dilemma game

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  • Shu, Gang
  • Du, Xia
  • Li, Ya

Abstract

Evolutionary game theory provides a useful, integrative framework for studying the evolution of cooperation. A new strategy updating method is proposed in our model. Due to people with diversified thinking, players are divided into two categories based on their different strategy updating method: ordinary players and advanced players. The former players only consider their neighbor’s payoff and updating strategy by classical Fermi rule, while the latter players take both the neighbors’ surrounding information and payoff into account. The results show that the neighbors surrounding information consideration contributes to the evolution of cooperation and finds the fraction of cooperation grows evidently with the increase of advanced players numbers. Our model may provide a pragmatic approach to the research of cooperation in social network.

Suggested Citation

  • Shu, Gang & Du, Xia & Li, Ya, 2016. "Surrounding information consideration promotes cooperation in Prisoner’s dilemma game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 689-694.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:91:y:2016:i:c:p:689-694
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2016.09.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Quan, Ji & Zhou, Yawen & Wang, Xianjia & Yang, Jian-Bo, 2020. "Information fusion based on reputation and payoff promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 368(C).
    2. Liu, Yuan & Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2022. "General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 165(P2).
    3. Quan, Ji & Zhou, Yawen & Wang, Xianjia & Yang, Jian-Bo, 2020. "Evidential reasoning based on imitation and aspiration information in strategy learning promotes cooperation in optional spatial public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    4. Kojo, Ken'ichi & Sakiyama, Tomoko, 2024. "Restructuring of neighborhood definition based on strategies will enhance the cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    5. Lu, Shounan & Zhu, Ge & Dai, Jianhua, 2023. "Promoting effect of adaptive interaction based on random neighbors to cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 450(C).
    6. Wang, Si-Yi & Wang, Qing-Lian & Zhang, Xiao-Wei & Wang, Rui-Wu, 2023. "Evolutionary cooperation dynamics of combining imitation and super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 456(C).

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