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On the implementation of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games

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  • Ueda, Masahiko

Abstract

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of cooperation. So far, not only general properties of zero-determinant strategies have been investigated, but zero-determinant strategies have been applied to control in the fields of information and communications technology and analysis of imitation. Here, we further deepen our understanding on general mathematical properties of zero-determinant strategies. We first prove that zero-determinant strategies, if exist, can be implemented by some one-dimensional transition probability. Next, we prove that, if a two-player game has a non-trivial potential function, a zero-determinant strategy exists in its repeated version. These results assist us to implement zero-determinant strategies in broader situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ueda, Masahiko, 2025. "On the implementation of zero-determinant strategies in repeated games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 489(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:489:y:2025:i:c:s0096300324006404
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2024.129179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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