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The effort and risk-taking effects of budget-based contracts

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  • Sprinkle, Geoffrey B.
  • Williamson, Michael G.
  • Upton, David R.

Abstract

We investigate how the budget levels embedded in budget-based contracts affect individual effort and risk-taking. We show that, from a wealth maximization perspective, a tradeoff exists between motivating effort and encouraging risk-taking. We illustrate an inverted-U relation between budget levels and effort. Budget levels and effort are positively correlated until budgets become very difficult, at which point individuals "give up." We illustrate an opposing, U-shaped, relation between budget levels and risk-taking. Low budgets provide the flexibility to take greater risks, whereas high budgets induce individuals to "play it safe" to ensure budget attainment. Risky projects provide the greatest probability of reaching very high (stretch) budgets. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically test this economic proposition vis-à-vis extant psychology research. Consistent with security-potential/aspiration theory, we find that individuals are willing to sacrifice expected wealth to either meet the budget or increase their potential payoffs. Our results suggest that the effort-risk tradeoff is mitigated at low budget levels, thereby increasing firm welfare, but is exacerbated at high budget levels, reducing firm welfare. Collectively, our results highlight the importance of understanding how managerial accounting practices such as budgets affect the various determinants of performance and not just performance per se. Our results also help reconcile conflicting evidence regarding where budget difficulty levels should be set.

Suggested Citation

  • Sprinkle, Geoffrey B. & Williamson, Michael G. & Upton, David R., 2008. "The effort and risk-taking effects of budget-based contracts," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(4-5), pages 436-452.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:33:y:2008:i:4-5:p:436-452
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    Cited by:

    1. Felix Bolduan & Ivo Schedlinsky & Friedrich Sommer, 2021. "The influence of compensation interdependence on risk-taking: the role of mutual monitoring," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 91(8), pages 1125-1148, October.
    2. Ivo Schedlinsky & Friedrich Sommer & Arnt Wöhrmann, 2016. "Risk-taking in tournaments: an experimental analysis," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(8), pages 837-866, November.
    3. Martin, Rachel & Thomas, Tyler, 2022. "Target setting with compensation discretion: How are ex ante targets affected when superiors have ex post discretion?," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    4. Amaury Grimand & Ewan Oiry & Aurélien Ragaigne, 2012. "Les Vertus Habilitantes Et Contraignantes Du Controle : Une Comparaison De Deux Etudes De Cas De Transformation Des Outils," Post-Print hal-00690940, HAL.
    5. Shana Clor-Proell & Steven Kaplan & Chad Proell, 2015. "The Impact of Budget Goal Difficulty and Promotion Availability on Employee Fraud," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 131(4), pages 773-790, November.
    6. Andrejkow, Joanna & Berger, Leslie & Guo, Lan, 2022. "Conscious and nonconscious goal pursuit in multidimensional tasks," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    7. Lachmann, Maik & Stefani, Ulrike & Wöhrmann, Arnt, 2015. "Fair value accounting for liabilities: Presentation format of credit risk changes and individual information processing," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 21-38.
    8. Mundy, Julia, 2010. "Creating dynamic tensions through a balanced use of management control systems," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 499-523, July.
    9. Colleen M. Boland & Corinna Ewelt-Knauer & Julia Schneider, 2022. "The gift that keeps on giving: corporate giving and excessive risk-taking," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 92(3), pages 355-396, April.
    10. Lisa-Marie Wibbeke & Maik Lachmann, 2020. "Psychology in management accounting and control research: an overview of the recent literature," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 275-328, September.
    11. Dunk, Alan S., 2011. "Product innovation, budgetary control, and the financial performance of firms," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 102-111.
    12. Clara Xiaoling Chen & Minjeong (MJ) Kim & Laura Yue Li & Wei Zhu, 2022. "Accounting Performance Goals in CEO Compensation Contracts and Corporate Risk Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6039-6058, August.
    13. Arnold, Markus & Artz, Martin, 2019. "The use of a single budget or separate budgets for planning and performance evaluation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 50-67.
    14. Anja Schwering, 2017. "The influence of peer honesty and anonymity on managerial reporting," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(9), pages 1151-1172, December.
    15. Jason L. Brown & Patrick R. Martin & Geoffrey B. Sprinkle & Dan Way, 2023. "How Return on Investment and Residual Income Performance Measures and Risk Preferences Affect Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 1301-1322, February.
    16. Thomas Liessem & Ivo Schedlinsky & Anja Schwering & Friedrich Sommer, 2015. "Budgetary slack under budget-based incentive schemes—the behavioral impact of social preferences, organizational justice, and moral disengagement," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 81-94, April.
    17. Derfuss, Klaus, 2016. "Reconsidering the participative budgeting–performance relation: A meta-analysis regarding the impact of level of analysis, sample selection, measurement, and industry influences," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 17-37.

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