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Can not wanting to wear a mask be rational?

Author

Listed:
  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

    (Rochester Institute of Technology)

Abstract

I answer the question in the title by analyzing an office environment in which n?N individuals work together in an enclosed area. The ith worker wears his mask for h_i hours per day and this action involves a disutility. His health benefit from wearing a mask depends on how his mask wearing compares with the mask wearing of his co-workers. In this setting, I first compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium that describes the optimal number of hours of mask wearing by each worker. Second, I compute the Pareto efficient level of mask wearing on the part of the n workers. Finally, I explain why there is excessive mask wearing in the Nash equilibrium and then point out that it can indeed be rational to not want to wear a mask.

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, 2022. "Can not wanting to wear a mask be rational?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(3), pages 1399-1404.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-21-01075
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2022/Volume42/EB-22-V42-I3-P118.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mask; Nash Equilibrium; Pareto Efficiency; Rat Race;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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