Ponzi game in OLG model with endogenous growth and productive government spending
Barro's model is an AK model, and there cannot be dynamic inefficiency since the social yield of the capital is higher than the growth rate. But it may be that the private yield and thus the interest rate are lower than the growth rate. One can thus have a Ponzi game and the government can allow a permanent roll-over of debt and cut taxes. However we show that in this model since the capital is under-accumulated, playing a Ponzi game produces a crowding-out of capital and reduces the growth rate and welfare. The practical message of this article is that even when the interest rate is lower than the growth rate, the public debt is not a Pareto improvement when it generates a crowding-out of capital and reduces endogenous growth.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ghosh, Sugata & Mourmouras, Iannis A., 2004. "Endogenous growth, welfare and budgetary regimes," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 623-635, December.
- Alexandru Minea & Patrick Villieu, 2009.
"Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The 'Golden Rule of Public Finance' Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting,"
Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 103-133, 03.
- Alexandru Minea & Patrick Villieu, 2009. "Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The "Golden Rule of Public Finance" Reconsidered in an Andogenous Growth Setting"," Post-Print hal-00387502, HAL.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00190. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.