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What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily?

Author

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  • Kazumine Kondo

    () (Faculty of Business and Commerce, Aichi Gakuin University)

Abstract

This paper examines what types of Japanese regional banks are more likely to obtain credit ratings at the present time when disclosures by financial institutions are becoming more and more important. We found that banks in more competitive markets, those that have larger assets, and those whose bad debt ratio is lower are more likely to disclose credit ratings. It was also revealed that regional banks in the same region (prefecture) as other banks that go bankrupt often feel it necessary to actively demonstrate their own solidness in the market by obtaining foreign credit ratings. We also analyzed whether regional banks that disclose more credit ratings succeed in obtaining financing from depositors. Our results indicate that regional banks that obtain more credit ratings, in particular foreign ratings, succeed in increasing their bank balances.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazumine Kondo, 2010. "What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(2), pages 1091-1104.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00052
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I2-P102.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark M. Spiegel & Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2003. "Determinants of voluntary bank disclosure: evidence from Japanese Shinkin banks," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    2. Cantor, Richard & Packer, Frank, 1997. "Differences of opinion and selection bias in the credit rating industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1395-1417, October.
    3. Poon, Winnie P. H., 2003. "Are unsolicited credit ratings biased downward?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 593-614, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    disclosure; credit ratings; market disciplines; scale of economies; bank balances.;

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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