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On the theory of equalizing differences Increasing abundances of types of workers may increase their earnings

Author

Listed:
  • Myrna Wooders

    (University of Warwick)

  • Edward Cartwright

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

The theory of equalising differences recognises that wage differentials may be required to equalise the attractiveness of alternative occupations. We examine this theory using the Conley/Wooders 'crowding types'' model. The crowding types model distinguishes between the tastes of a player and his crowding type, those attributes of the player that directly effect the well-being of other players in the same club - a player''s skill, productivity or personality are examples. A club can be interpreted as firm in which the job attributes are the club goods thus, the crowding types model, with its distinction between tastes and crowding types, provides a natural environment in which to study equalising differences. In contrast to results for earlier models, we demonstrate that even when small groups of players are strictly effective in a strong sense, an increase in the abundance of players of one crowding type can increase the core payoffs to players of that crowding type.

Suggested Citation

  • Myrna Wooders & Edward Cartwright, 2001. "On the theory of equalizing differences Increasing abundances of types of workers may increase their earnings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(4), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01d40001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    2. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
    3. Bennett, Elaine & Wooders, Myrna, 1979. "Income distribution and firm formation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 304-317, September.
    4. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1999. "A law of scarcity for games," Economic Research Papers 269297, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    5. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "Taste-homogeneity of optimal jurisdictions in a Tiebout economy with crowding types and endogenous educational investment choices," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 367-387, December.
    6. Sherwin Rosen, 2005. "Substitution And Division Of Labour," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 3, pages 29-51 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 1997. "Equivalence of the Core and Competitive Equilibrium in a Tiebout Economy with Crowding Types," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 421-440, May.
    8. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1983. "The epsilon core of a large replica game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 277-300, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Some corrections to claims about the literature in Engl and Scotchmer (1996)," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 295-309, December.
    2. Chenlu Li & Simon C Moore & Jesse Smith & Sarah Bauermeister & John Gallacher, 2019. "The costs of negative affect attributable to alcohol consumption in later life: A within-between random longitudinal econometric model using UK Biobank," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(2), pages 1-15, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cooperative game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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