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Las ofertas en el procedimiento abierto: un estudio de las licitaciones de servicios realizadas por las Fuerzas Armadas españolas

Author

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  • Jorge González Chapela

    (Centro Universitario de la Defensa de Zaragoza. España.)

Abstract

The probability that a services procurement undertaken by the Spanish Armed Forces becomes null and void is analyzed, as well as the winning bid in the case of procurements which were awarded. To do this, a sample selection model is estimated using data compiled from the Public Sector Contracting Platform. The estimation results may help to improve the management of, and to promote efficiency in, future services procurements

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge González Chapela, 2016. "Las ofertas en el procedimiento abierto: un estudio de las licitaciones de servicios realizadas por las Fuerzas Armadas españolas," Economic Analysis Working Papers (2002-2010). Atlantic Review of Economics (2011-2016), Colexio de Economistas de A Coruña, Spain and Fundación Una Galicia Moderna, vol. 2, pages 1-1, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eac:articl:12/15
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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