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L’incidence de l’activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance:le cas français

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  • Carine Girard

    (Audencia Nantes)

Abstract

(VF)Afin d’apporter un nouvel éclairage aux études antérieures sur l’absence de réaction boursière à l’annonce publique d’un activisme actionnarial, cet article cherche à déterminer les aménagements organisationnels entrepris pour réduire la visibilité de la cause actionnariale. À partir d’un échantillon de 59 sociétés cotées sujettes au mécontentement d’actionnaires minoritaires de janvier 1989 à décembre 2000, nous cherchons à mesurer les effets de cette dissidence sur les mécanismes de gouvernance en fonction du degré d’influence exercé par la minorité d’actionnaires.(VA) Prior research shows that the absence of a significant market reaction at public announcement of shareholder activism is largely attributable to the weak visibility of conflict. For this reason we studied changes in corporate governance relevant to the visibility of conflict. From a sample of 59 listed companies with dissident shareholders between January 1989 and December 2000, we tried to measure the effects of shareholder activism on corporate governance according to the degree of influence of minority shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Carine Girard, 2004. "L’incidence de l’activisme actionnarial sur les mécanismes de gouvernance:le cas français," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 7(3), pages 91-116, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:7:y:2004:i:q3:p:91-116
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernement des entreprises; activisme actionnarial; bataille de procurations; corporate governance; shareholder activism; proxy contests.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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