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Public sector, information and incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Jan-Erik LANE

    (Public Policy Institute, Geneva, Switzerland)

Abstract

This paper explores the role of information and incentives in the public sector. It discusses how bureaucratic structures and incentive mechanisms affect policy implementation and service delivery. The study emphasizes the need for transparency and accountability to improve public sector performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan-Erik LANE, 2019. "Public sector, information and incentives," Journal of Economic and Social Thought, EconSciences Journals, vol. 6(4), pages 243-251, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ3:v:6:y:2019:i:4:p:243-251
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 209-287, October.
    2. Williamson, Oliver E, 1973. "Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 316-325, May.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Working Papers 1, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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