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Rational decisions and responses of dictatorships in authoritarian states with veto power

Author

Listed:
  • Takaharu ISHII

    (Bus iness Brea kthrough Unive rs ity, De pa rture of Ma nage ment, Koujimachi Square Building 1F,3 Niba n-cho Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo,102-0084 J a pa n)

Abstract

Using the model, this study makes eight policy recommendations for creating a new postwar deterrent world order when the warring parties a re authoritrian dictators hips with veto power and nuclear powe rs . First, as long as the ceasefire condition is the abandonment of a n independent state by a dictators hip and the retention of an independent state by a n inva de d s ta te, cease fire ne gotia tions te nd to be pa ra lle l unless a me dia tor is obta ine d; Se cond, s ince de mocra tic s ta tes require public conse nt before the decis ion to s ta rt the wa r, the obs tacles to the s ta rt of the wa r are this is grea ter tha n in dicta tors hips . Third, the dis ta nce be twee n a dicta tors hip a nd a country de termines the decis ions of its lea ders . The greate r the dis ta nce , the more like ly it is to provide only economic as s is ta nce . The close r a country is to the point whe re it fee ls threa te ne d if the occupa tion is tolera te d, the more milita ry ass is ta nce it will provide . Fourth, whe n a dicta tors hip initia tes a wa r of a ggress ion, ne ighboring countrie s te nd to use economic sa nctions to wea ke n the dicta tors hip's a bility to wa ge war to a void a ma jor-powe r wa r. Fifth, it is essentia l to introduce a s ys tem in which the ve to powe r of a pe rma ne nt member of the UN Se curity Council is s us pe nde d if it viola tes the UN Cha rter or is a wa r pa rty. The s ixth is the es ta blis hment of a pe rma nent UN force tha t ca n inte rve ne in a reas of conflict by a ce rta in le ve l of resolution of the UN Ge ne ra l As sembly. Regis ter with the UN volunteer s oldiers who ca n a ct in the e xe rcise of wa r, so tha t the y can be de ploye d early in the e ve nt of a wa r of a ggress ion by a ma jor power a ga ins t a minor power. Eighth, ma ke wa rtime s ta teme nts by dicta tors a nd lea de rs of inva de d countries in the me dia a nd e lse where binding unde r inte rna tiona l la w

Suggested Citation

  • Takaharu ISHII, 2022. "Rational decisions and responses of dictatorships in authoritarian states with veto power," Journal of Economics and Political Economy, EconSciences Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 54-80, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ1:v:9:y:2022:i:1:p:54-80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jennifer Gandhi & Adam Przeworski, 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, And Rebellion Under Dictatorships," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(1), pages 1-26, March.
    2. Aoki, Masahiko, 2017. "Strategies and public propositions in games of institutional change: Comparative historical cases," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 171-187.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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