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Mill ownership and farmer's cooperative behavior: the case of Costa Rica coffee farmers

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  • HOPFENSITZ, ASTRID
  • MIQUEL-FLORENSA, JOSEPA

Abstract

We analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer's behavior in an experimental public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point (cooperative vs. privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners (partners selling to the same type of mill or not). We find that cooperative farmers do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when playing with partners from the same type of mill. However, though farmers selling to private mills make no difference with respect to the background of partners, farmers selling to cooperatives significantly decrease contributions when paired with non-cooperative members. Finally, we study how self-selection into a mechanism that punishes the lowest contributors effects contributions both inside the group and with partners of the opposite background, and we show that it increases contributions by cooperative farmers interacting with non-cooperative farmers by more than 100%.

Suggested Citation

  • Hopfensitz, Astrid & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, 2017. "Mill ownership and farmer's cooperative behavior: the case of Costa Rica coffee farmers," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 623-648, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:13:y:2017:i:03:p:623-648_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhiyuan Zhu & Jiajia Duan & Shilin Li & Zhenzhong Dai & Yongzhong Feng, 2022. "Phenomenon of Non-Grain Production of Cultivated Land Has Become Increasingly Prominent over the Last 20 Years: Evidence from Guanzhong Plain, China," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-14, October.
    2. repec:tse:wpaper:27881 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Matteo M. Galizzi & Daniel Navarro-Martinez, 2019. "On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 976-1002, March.
    4. Alves, Guillermo & Blanchard, Pablo & Burdin, Gabriel & Chávez, Mariana & Dean, Andrés, 2022. "Like principal, like agent? Managerial preferences in employee-owned firms," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 877-899, December.
    5. J. Nicolas Hernandez-Aguilera & Max Mauerman & Alexandra Herrera & Kathryn Vasilaky & Walter Baethgen & Ana Maria Loboguerrero & Rahel Diro & Yohana Tesfamariam Tekeste & Daniel Osgood, 2020. "Games and Fieldwork in Agriculture: A Systematic Review of the 21st Century in Economics and Social Science," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-22, October.
    6. Ernesto Reuben & Matthew Wiswall & Basit Zafar, 2017. "Preferences and Biases in Educational Choices and Labour Market Expectations: Shrinking the Black Box of Gender," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2153-2186, September.
    7. Qidi Dong & Qiao Peng & Xiaohong Luo & Heng Lu & Pengman He & Yanling Li & Linjia Wu & Di Li, 2024. "The Optimal Zoning of Non-Grain-Producing Cultivated Land Consolidation Potential: A Case Study of the Dujiangyan Irrigation District," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(17), pages 1-23, September.
    8. Tom Lane, 2015. "Discrimination in the laboratory: a meta-analysis," Discussion Papers 2015-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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