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Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?

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  • Kavka, Gregory S.

Abstract

It is commonplace to suppose that the theory of individual rational choice is considerably less problematic than the theory of collective rational choice. In particular, it is often assumed by philosophers, economists, and other social scientists that an individual's choices among outcomes (or lotteries yielding specified probabilities of outcomes) accurately reflect that individual's underlying preferences or values. Further, it is now well known that if an individual's choices among outcomes (or lotteries thereof) satisfy certain plausible axioms of rationality or consistency, that individual's choice-behavior can be interpreted as maximizing expected utility on a utility scale that is unique up to a linear transformation (Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Hence, there is, in principle, an empirically respectable method of measuring individuals' values and a single unified schema for explaining their actions as value maximizing (insofar as they act rationally).

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  • Kavka, Gregory S., 1991. "Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 143-165, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:02:p:143-165_00
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    1. David Calnitsky & Asher Dupuy-Spencer, 2013. "The economic consequences of homo economicus: neoclassical economic theory and the fallacy of market optimality," The Journal of Philosophical Economics, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, vol. 6(2), May.
    2. Frank, Bjorn, 1996. "The use of internal games: The case of addiction," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 651-660, November.
    3. Elias L. Khalil, 2002. "Information, Knowledge and the Close of Friedrich Hayek's System: A Comment," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(3), pages 319-341, Summer.
    4. Stephen J. Meardon & Andreas Ortmann, 1996. "Self-Command In Adam Smith'S Theory Of Moral Sentiments," Rationality and Society, , vol. 8(1), pages 57-80, February.
    5. Müller Christian, 2004. "Christliche Sozialethik und das Wertproblem in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 55(1), pages 77-98, January.
    6. Elodie Brahic & Valérie Clément & Nathalie Moureau & Marion Vidal, 2008. "A la recherche des Merit Goods," Working Papers 08-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2008.
    7. Paavola, Jouni & Adger, W. Neil, 2005. "Institutional ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-368, May.
    8. Kangas, Olli E., 1997. "Self-interest and the common good: The impact of norms, selfishness and context in social policy opinions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 475-494.
    9. John B. Davis, 2004. "Identity and Commitment: Sen's Conception of the Individual," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-055/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    10. Khalil, Elias L., 1999. "Sentimental fools: a critique of Amartya Sen's notion of commitment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 373-386, December.
    11. Mann, Stefan, 2003. "Why organic food in Germany is a merit good," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(5-6), pages 459-469.
    12. Stefan Mann, 2006. "Merit goods in a utilitarian framework," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 509-520.
    13. Gans, Joshua S., 1996. "On the impossibility of rational choice under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 287-309, March.
    14. Jouni Paavola, 2003. "Environmental decisions and theories of justice: Implications for economic analysis and policy practice," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 33(1), pages 33-43, September.

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