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(In)sinceridad regulatoria:(des)considerando los costos de hacer cumplir la regulación ambiental

Author

Listed:
  • José Hernández

    (Universidad San Sebastián)

  • Juan Monckeberg

Abstract

Este artículo identifica un problema en la práctica regulatoria ambiental de Chile: la adopción de regulación sustantiva con costos de fiscalización y sanción que son ignorados o muy subestimados. Aunque esta práctica viola la regulación adjetiva, puede explicarse por un diseño institucional que separa funciones en diferentes organismos: el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente tiene incentivos para adoptar regulación sustantiva e inmediatamente internalizar el crédito político, externalizando el eventual costo del fracaso en la Superintendencia de Medio Ambiente. La experiencia comparada maneja este problema a través de un organismo independiente de control de calidad de las evaluaciones de impacto regulatorio.

Suggested Citation

  • José Hernández & Juan Monckeberg, 2018. "(In)sinceridad regulatoria:(des)considerando los costos de hacer cumplir la regulación ambiental," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(152), pages 47-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2018:i:152:p:47-89
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. G. Hodgson, 2007. "What Are Institutions?," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 8.
    3. North, Douglass C., 1989. "Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(9), pages 1319-1332, September.
    4. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1994. "Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 141-162, September.
    5. Heyes, Anthony G, 1998. "Making Things Stick: Enforcement and Compliance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 14(4), pages 50-63, Winter.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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