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Relación entre el stock de recurso de propiedad común y el crecimiento población que lo explota. Caso extracción piangua ensenada de Tumaco. Colombia

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  • Rebellón Carlos

Abstract

La explotación de recursos de uso común constituye la única fuente de ingresos de una porción significativa de hogares en países en desarrollo. El objetivo de este documento es mostrar empíricamente que cuando un recurso de uso común escasea, esto ocasiona un crecimiento demográfico tal que dicha escasez se incrementa hasta hacer insostenible la explotación. El trabajo se aplica a la explotación de un molusco en la Ensenada de Tumaco conocido como Piangua (Anadara Tuberculosa). Para las estimaciones, se parte de un modelo de equilibrio parcial y otro de equilibrio general. El primer modelo se estima por MCO, mientras el segundo simula la tendencia de la población para un horizonte de 60 anos. En ambos modelos se verifica la hipótesis de trabajo. En particular, los hogares pueden pasar de un numero de miembros promedio de 3 a 4, lo cual puede llevar al rápido agotamiento del recurso en menos de 12 anos.

Suggested Citation

  • Rebellón Carlos, 2004. "Relación entre el stock de recurso de propiedad común y el crecimiento población que lo explota. Caso extracción piangua ensenada de Tumaco. Colombia," Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad, Universidad de los Andes,Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000090:003860
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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