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Tax incentives and fertility in Canada: quantum vs tempo effects

Author

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  • Daniel Parent
  • Ling Wang

Abstract

Using inter-jurisdictional differences in the implementation of the Family Allowance Program in Canada in the mid-1970s, this paper first shows that Quebec families with two or more children prior to being exposed to the program responded quite strongly to the added incentives in the short run relative to women in other Canadian provinces. Tracking down the cohorts across Censuses, we find that the same group of Quebec families subsequently showed a decrease in fertility relative to the rest of Canada, leaving ultimate family size unaffected. These results are consistent with the program having generated only a timing effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Parent & Ling Wang, 2007. "Tax incentives and fertility in Canada: quantum vs tempo effects," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(2), pages 371-400, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:2:p:371-400
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jérôme Adda & Christian Dustmann & Katrien Stevens, 2017. "The Career Costs of Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(2), pages 293-337.
    2. Michael F. Lovenheim & Kevin J. Mumford, 2010. "Do Family Wealth Shocks Affect Fertility Choices? Evidence from the Housing Market Boom and Bust," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1228, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    3. Richard Crump & Gopi Shah Goda & Kevin J. Mumford, 2011. "Fertility and the Personal Exemption: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1616-1628, June.
    4. Xiaoling Ang, 2015. "The Effects of Cash Transfer Fertility Incentives and Parental Leave Benefits on Fertility and Labor Supply: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 263-288, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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